Mapping Report > Section II. Inventory of Specific Acts of Violence > CHAPTER II. Acts of violence committed against children > B. Specific case of children associated with armed groups and forces (CAAFAG) > 5. Demobilisation and reintegration

The first demobilisation efforts date back to 1998, and all peace accords and ceasefire agreements since the 1999 Lusaka Accord have constantly highlighted the obligation on armed groups to demobilise CAAFAG and bring their recruitment and use to an end.

In the face of national and international pressure to end the recruitment and use of CAAFAG, most of the armed groups’ leaders have stated their opposition to this practice and given commitments to bring child recruitment to an end. Yet the demobilisation of CAAFAG has often been more a symbolic, public relations-oriented exercise than a sincere commitment. A large proportion of demobilised CAAFAG were, in fact, later re-recruited.¹³⁰⁴

In 2000, in his report on children and armed conflict, the Secretary-General estimated that there were between 10,000 and 20,000 children under 15 years of age in the various fighting forces in the DRC.¹³⁰⁵ That same year, President Kabila signed a decree banning the recruitment of children under 18 years of age into the armed forces and the deployment of child soldiers in combat zones. During the same period, the RCD-Goma issued an instruction creating a committee for the demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers in the territory under its control.¹³⁰⁶ And yet the results were not forthcoming on either side. In May 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict, Mr Olara Otunnu, visited the DRC and met with President Joseph Kabila, with the leaders of the RCD and with the leaders of the Front pour la libération du Congo (FLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.¹³⁰⁷ Following this visit, both the Government and the RCD produced action plans for the demobilisation of CAAFAG. At the start of 2001, the Government agreed to demobilise a total of 4,000 CAAFAG; however, a year later, only around 300 had actually been released.¹³⁰⁸ At the same time, the RCD estimated that there were 2,600 CAAFAG within its forces.¹³⁰⁹ Transit and orientation camps were established in Kisangani, Goma and Bukavu. Yet again, despite these claims, the armed groups continued to enlist children. The ANC/APR, for example, incorporated CAAFAG who had been serving in the local defence forces (FDL) into its army. ¹³¹⁰ Only around 650 CAAFAG were demobilised by the RCD-Goma between December 2001 and November 2003.¹³¹¹

Rwandan children were also recruited and used by various groups, above all the ex-FAR/Interahamwe/ALiR/FDLR, different Mayi-Mayi groups and, in part, the RCD. Between May 2001 and July 2004, more than 550 of them were demobilised. Many of them had left Rwanda with their families during or immediately after the 1994 genocide. They were recruited or abducted from refugee camps or from the villages in which they were living.¹³¹²

CAAFAG were also abandoned or released by different armed groups in an ad-hoc manner.¹³¹³ At the start of 2003, the RCD-ML gave NGOs access to some camps and dozens of CAAFAG were released and entrusted to a local NGO with a view to reintegrating them into their communities.¹³¹⁴ This scant progress was continually thwarted by persistent parallel recruitments, however, including the abduction of girls for sexual purposes – in particular in Maniema, Katanga, in North and South Kivu and Ituri¹³¹⁵ – and the continuing and widespread use of CAAFAG.¹³¹⁶ The intensification of the conflict in Ituri in May 2003, for example, gave rise to a significant increase in CAAFAG recruitment drives by all parties to the conflict.¹³¹⁷

The lack of a national DDR plan until July 2004 meant that the demobilisation of CAAFAG remained fragmentary and difficult. A large number of demobilisations were achieved through the direct negotiation of specific cases.¹³¹⁸ A resumption in recruitments, the continuing insecurity, a lack of local capacity to receive children and the absence of viable alternatives for young people were all obstacles to their effective reintegration, obstacles that persist to this day.

Despite all these difficulties, the large number of children that were demobilised from 2004 onwards, more than 30,000, confirms the scale of the CAAFAG problem.¹³¹⁹  It is important to note that very few female CAAFAG were demobilised: as of 2003, Save the Children had counted only nine!¹³²⁰ Although the girls were not always as visible as the soldiers, it is estimated that thousands formed part of the armed groups, particularly for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Most of the girls chose to self-demobilise when they got the chance, through fear of stigma, although many of them were not released by their commanding officers and were declared as “wives”.