Mapping Report > Section II. Inventory of Specific Acts of Violence > CHAPTER II. Acts of violence committed against children > B. Specific case of children associated with armed groups and forces (CAAFAG) > 2. Recruitment and use of children from 1993 to 2003
There are various reasons explaining why children were recruited on such a large scale during the different conflicts in the DRC. Some factors are intrinsic to armed conflicts in general and occur in conflicts the world over. Rebel groups often justify child recruitment with the need to overthrow the government and have armies of at least equal number – as in the case of the AFDL/APR in 1996. Moreover, armed groups in the DRC lack military training and professionalism and do not therefore generally develop complex military strategies. Many battles were thus won simply by virtue of superior numbers. The more child soldiers an armed group could recruit, the better their chances of military victory.1253 Rebel armies and groups also use children because of their availability and malleability in a drawn-out conflict. Generally paid little or nothing, they are a very low cost factor, all the more so as they are equipped with cheap arms. Their obedience and their limited awareness of danger are often cited by commanders when explaining their interest in recruiting children, as can be seen from a statement by Col. Ntambo Mutchaïl of the AFDL/APR following the capture of Lubumbashi in 1997:
“They are the best. At this age there is total obedience. They are not distracted. They haven’t yet experienced a private life. They are devoted to one thing: to the Alliance. They have nothing else in their heads. They are not worried by morals. They are devoted to the Alliance”1254.
The children often enlist into the army or a rebel group of their own accord, either spontaneously or following an intensive recruitment drive. There are many factors behind the phenomenon of “voluntary recruitment”.1255 Most of the children see this as the only option for protecting themselves or surviving economically. Some see it as an act of patriotism, a contribution to the cause; others sign up to avenge the death of their parents or on the basis of their ethnic belonging. In Kivu and in Ituri, in particular, recruitment was frequently justified by the need to defend a community from external attacks. Thousands of boys and girls were also, however, recruited against their will and that of their family. Children were forcibly abducted either at night or in broad daylight, in the town or even at home or at school. Children that were separated from their families or that had been displaced were also easy targets for the recruiters.1256
Although the phenomenon of child recruitment existed prior to 1996, it was not widely known, as demonstrated by the curiosity and astonishment of Zairians during the AFDL’s advance. The large number of Kadogo (meaning “little ones” in Swahili) among the troops that marched on Kinshasa in May 1997 surprised both the local people and the international media. What was incorrectly described as a new phenomenon at the time was then taken up by all the other armed groups in the DRC during the conflicts of 1998 to 2003.
Recruitment and use of CAAFAG before 1996
The ex-FAR/Interahamwe were allegedly recruiting children in the Rwandan refugee camps in the east of Zaire and Tanzania between 1994 and 1996.1257 They used active recruitment methods, such as going from door to door, but would also forcibly abduct children. Children questioned by Save the Children all indicated that they had had no choice, even when they expressly refused to be recruited.1258 In 1995, researchers from Human Rights Watch noted that the ex-FAR were using CAAFAG in at least two camps, Panzi and Lac Vert.1259
Recruitment and use of CAAFAG during the first war
As previously noted, the recruitment and use of CAAFAG in Zaire escalated rapidly in 1996 when the AFDL/APR began to attack North and South Kivu. Over the course of 1996, several thousand children were recruited allegedly by the AFDL/APR in South Kivu, particularly on Idjwi Island, at Uvira and in the Hauts Plateaux region. Some received military training in Bukavu.1260 In Bukavu itself, most children were recruited around Avenue Maniema, where the AFDL’s headquarters were located. The recruits received basic military training at Kidoti, in Uvira territory, before being sent to the front.1261
At the end of 1996, the AFDL/APR apparently also began to recruit large numbers of children in North Kivu, in Rutshuru and Masisi territories. The AFDL/APR conducted these recruitment drives by going directly into schools. In some cases, the recruiters promised children food or money; in others, children were forcibly enlisted. Some of them were scarcely 10 years old. Once enlisted, they were unable to leave. Most of the region’s recruits received minimal military training at Matebe camp near Rutshuru town.1262 During the course of its advance on Kinshasa, the AFDL/APR systematically recruited CAAFAG in order to expand troop numbers. Once the Mobutu regime had been overthrown, these children were largely integrated into the new government army, the FAC, or – with the start of the second war in 1998 – into the ANC/APR.
During the first war, the Mayi-Mayi, particularly in North Kivu, allegedly also forcibly and voluntarily recruited minors, girls and boys, many of them no more than 11 years old.1263
Recruitment and use of CAAFAG during the second war
The second war was marked by numerous conflicts between the government forces and a multitude of rebel groups and foreign armies, in a country divided in two. In 2003, 12 parties to the conflict1264 were cited as having recruited and used CAAFAG in the Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict.1265 The FAC/FARDC have been cited in every report since 2002.1266
Forces armées congolaises (FAC)
Not only did the Government apparently incorporate most of the Kadogo who had fought in the AFDL/APR into the new government army but also, with the start of the second war, began to actively recruit children once more. An official announcement broadcast on the national radio on 7 August 1998 invited children and youths between the ages of 12 and 20 to enlist in the armed forces following the commencement of the second war. In addition to Kinshasa, recruitments took place at the Mbuji-Mayi airport in Kasai Occidental and in Katanga.1267 Despite a presidential decree of June 2000 on the demobilisation of children and announcements made by Joseph Kabila in June 2001, child recruitment continued unabated. By 2003, the UN estimated that 10% of the FAC was made up of CAAFAG and the Minister of Human Rights admitted that there were 3,000 CAAFAG waiting to be demobilised within the FAC.1268
Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie and local defence forces linked to the RCD
The army of the RCD (and later that of the RCD-G), the ANC, with the support of the APR, were among those groups with the most CAAFAG in their ranks. The ANC used a wide range of methods to recruit children, some focusing on voluntary recruitment and others on forced. Numerous children were abducted both day and night, from their homes, from schools or at the market.1269
After the second war broke out in August 1998, ANC/APR soldiers reportedly recruited large numbers of children into their ranks in South Kivu, along with a hundred or so minors who had previously been demobilised by UNICEF. To begin with, child recruitment into the ANC took place on a voluntary basis in the context of an awareness raising campaign aimed at parents. When this failed, the ANC soldiers proceeded to conduct systematic forced recruitments. Many children were abducted as they left their schools or while at the market. The recruits were forced to undergo military training in the DRC or Rwanda, under the command of APR soldiers. In 2002, there were still more than a thousand children in the ranks of the ANC/APR. Despite official denials, the forced recruitment of children continued until at least June 2003.1270
In addition to its main forces, the RCD-Goma had a paramilitary force under its control known as the Forces de défense locale (FDL), which claimed to have 10,000 members, and which operated along the same lines as forces that had existed in Rwanda and Uganda for several years. The FDL was made up of numerous CAAFAG who received only rudimentary military training and who were rarely paid.1271
Mouvement national de libération du Congo (MLC)
The MLC’s army, the ALC, with the backing of the Ugandan Army, the UPDF, allegedly also recruited children, primarily in Mbandaka, Équateur Province. In 2001, the MLC admitted to having 1,800 CAAFAG within its ranks.1272 The child soldiers were involved in ALC offensives during which serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were committed. This was particularly the case in the attacks carried out within the context of the “Erasing the Board” operation.1273
Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML)
According to MONUC, a considerable number of children were recruited, both voluntarily and forcibly, by the APC, the military wing of the RCD-K/ML. Abducted children are reported to have sometimes been taken to Uganda to undergo military training.1274
Mayi-Mayi Groups
In 2002, a number of organisations estimated that one-half of all Mayi-Mayi forces were children, including some scarcely eight years of age.1275 The different Mayi-Mayi groups did allegedly abduct and recruit children, particularly in North and South Kivu, in Ituri, Maniema and Katanga.1276 Between 2001 and 2003, groups operating in Malemba Nkulu territory, Katanga, abducted and recruited several dozen CAAFAG. Most of these were used to carry looted goods and munitions, to do the cooking and to act as sex slaves.
Some of them received guns and served as guards while others participated in the hostilities against the ANC/APR and then later against the FAC.1277Other Mayi-Mayi also used CAAFAG, particularly the Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga group, which was accompanied by numerous CAAFAG at the time of its surrender to MONUC.1278
Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU)
The ADF/NALU made widespread use of CAAFAG. In 2000, for example, north of Beni and at Bulongo, a town at the foot of the Ruwenzori Mountains (North Kivu), the ADF/NALU allegedly abducted and enslaved hundreds of civilians, and conducted widespread forced recruitments of CAAFAG. The people abducted, including children, were forced to carry looted goods over long distances. The ADF/NALU obliged the men and boys to undergo military training in order to fight in their ranks.1279
Ex-Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe, ALiR and FDLR
During their attacks on civilian populations, the ex-Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe, along with members of the ALiR and FDLR, reportedly abducted a large number of children and also conscripted their own children into their ranks.1280
The Ituri militia (UPC, FNI, FRPI, FAPC and PUSIC)
Between 2001 and 2003, the armed groups in Ituri (UPC, FNI, FRPI, FAPC and PUSIC) between them recruited thousands of children on the basis of their ethnic belonging. Thousands of Hema children allegedly recruited by the UPC underwent military training in the Mandro, Katoto and Bule camps. During this training, they were often tortured and subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. In 2000, at least 163 of these children were sent to Uganda to undergo military training in the UPDF camp at Kyankwanzi. Between 2002 and 2003, some children associated with the UPC were abducted and taken to Rwanda to undergo military training in the APR camps. An unknown number of Lendu children were taken to military training camps in North Kivu. Other communities were also affected by this phenomenon, particularly the Alur, primarily in Mahagi territory.1281 Thomas Lubanga (UPC), Bosco Ntaganda (UPC) Germain Katanga (FRPI) and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (FNI) are, moreover, all accused by the ICC of having involved children actively in the hostilities in Ituri. The Forces armées populaires congolaises (FAPC) reportedly also recruited an unknown number of minors, particularly during 2003.1282
Other armed groups
Masunzu’s forces, the RCD-N and Mudundu-401283 were also cited in the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict1284 as having recruited and used child soldiers. All the Burundian political groups, along with the Forces armées burundaises (FAB), recruited and used child soldiers.1285
See also:
1252 This section does not attempt to be exhaustive; the fact that some armed groups are not mentioned does not mean that they did not recruit and use child soldiers.
1253 AI, Children at War, 2003.
1254 ”Zaïre: le fleuve de sang”, French documentary, La marche du siècle, June 1997; Jean-Marie Cavada, third report, “Premiers jours au nouveau Congo”; Jean-Francois Gringoire and Lionel de Coninck “À minute 01:21, le colonel Ntambo Mutchaïl de l’AFDL s’exprime devant la caméra au sujet des Kadogo”.
1255 A critical analysis of progress made and obstacles encountered in increasing protection for war-affected children (A/55/749).
1256 HRW, “Reluctant recruits: children and adults forcibly recruited for military service in North Kivu”, May 2001; AI, Children at War, 2003.
1257 ICG, Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration, 2003.
1258 Save the Children, Crossing the Border, July 2004.
1259 HRW, “Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide”, May 1995.
1260 Confidential document provided to the Mapping Team by the local NGO MESEP, South Kivu, March
2009.
1261 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009.
1262 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March and April 2009.
1263 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
1264 The Forces armées congolaises (FAC), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Goma (RCD-G), the Mouvement national de libération du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–National (RCD-N), the Hema militia (UPC and PUSIC), the Lendu/Ngiti militia (FNI and FPRI), the Forces armées populaires congolaises (FAPC), the Mayi-Mayi, Mudundu 40, Masunzu’s forces and the ex- Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe.
1265 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/58/546–S/2003/1053 and Corr. 1 and 2).
1266 Reports of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict: S/2002/1299, A/58/546-S/2003/1053 and Corr. 1 and 2, A/59/695-S/2005/72, A/61/529-S/2006/826 and Corr.1, A/62/609-S/2007/757 and A/63/785- S/2009/158 and Corr.1.
1267 HRW, Casualties of War, February 1999.
1268 AI, Children at War, 2003.
1269 Additional report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict (E/CN.4/2000/71); Fifth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/1156); HRW, “Reluctant recruits: children and adults forcibly recruited for military service in North Kivu”, May 2001.
1270 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February, March 2009; HRW, Casualties of War, 1999; Child Soldiers, CRC Country Briefs, 2004; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 – DRC, 2001.
1271 AI, Children at War, 2003.
1272 Ibid.
1273 Minority Rights Group International, Erasing the Board: Report of the international research mission into crimes under international law committed against the Bambuti Pygmies in the eastern DRC, 2004.
1274 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January–February 2000. At the end of 2000, some 165 Congolese children were abducted from Bunia, Beni and Butembo and deported to Uganda. Fifth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/1156); Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict (A/56/453) .
1275 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 – DRC, 2004; Watch List, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in the DRC, 2003.
1276 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema, 2008 and 2009; AI, Children at War, 2003.
1277 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008.
1278 Gédéon was convicted of, among other things, crimes against humanity, including the recruitment of child soldiers, 5 March 2009.
1279 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
1280 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and April 2009; confidential document provided to the Mapping Team in South Kivu by the NGO MESEP, March 2009.
1281 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, April and May 2009; confidential documents provided to the Mapping Team in South Kivu; MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573); BBC News, “UN finds Congo Child Soldiers”, 21 February 2001; BBC News, “DR Congo Awash with Child Soldiers”, 17 February 2003.
1282 MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573).
1283 The head of this militia group, Jean-Pierre Biyoyo, was convicted by a military court in March 2006 of, among other things, the arbitrary arrest and illegal detention of children in South Kivu in April 2004. Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC (S/2009/253).
1284 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/58/546–S/2003/1053 and Corr. 1 and 2).
1285 Confidential document provided to the Mapping Team in South Kivu by the NGO MESEP, March 2009; AI, Children at War, 2003.